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THE IMPLICATIONS OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983 FOR THE
PRIVATIZATION OF PRISONS t
CHARLES W. THOMAS* AND LINDA S. CALVERT HANSON**
More than 900,000 people are currently confined in local jails and
state and federal prisons. Since the early 1980's government officials,
faced with the rising costs of providing for these individuals, have
considered privatizing correctional facilities. Essential to
government's interest and to the private sector's willingness to
provide correctional facilities is a resolution of the liability each will
be exposed to as a result of lawsuits brought by inmates confined in
private facilities. In this Article, Professor Thomas and Ms. Calvert
Hanson provide an overview of how courts will most likely apply 42
U.S.C. § 1983 in such cases.
T HIS Article examines how the single most influential element of
constitutional tort jurisprudence-42 U.S.C. § 1983'-is likely to
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1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Precisely when section 1983 actions began to be described quite routinely as "constitutional
torts" is uncertain, but at least one commentator, Professor Susanah Mead, has suggested that
Professor Marshall Shapo first coined the term in his article entitled Constitutional Tort: Mon-
roe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 277, 323-24 (1965). See Mead, Evolu-
tion of the "Species of Tort Liability" Created by 42 U.S. C. § 1983: Can Constitutional Tort be
Saved from Extinction?, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 2 n.8 (1986).
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shape the civil liability exposure of the growing number of private
firms that contract with state and local agencies for the full-scale
management 2 of correctional facilities.' A growing number of govern-
ment officials view privatization 4 as a means of addressing such criti-
cal concerns as overcrowding and rapidly rising correctional costs,'
but they are uncertain about the magnitude of the liability risks they
will encounter if they privatize their correctional facilities. Private cor-
rections firms, in turn, are seeking an understanding of the liability
exposure they are likely to encounter under section 1983.
Although the viability of privatization has been the subject of
much debate and commentary, 6 the extent of the liability of a private
2. Privatization in the correctional arena comes in two general forms. Partial privatization
refers to local units of government contracting with the private sector for the provision of serv-
ices such as those relating to education, food, medical care, and vocational training. Full privati-
zation refers to units of government contracting with the private sector for the complete
management of a correctional facility. Although this analysis is primarily concerned with full
privatization, most if not all of the analysis would be equally relevant to partially privatized
operations.
3. Between 1972 and 1982, the "total dollar amount of local government contract awards
with private firms [increased] from [approximately] $22 billion to $65 billion [and] every indica-
tion is that this number has continued to rise since 1982." DUDEK & COMPANY, PRIVATIZATION
AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES: Tn IMPACT OF CITY AND COUNTY CONTRACTING OUT ON GOVERNMENT
WORKERS 8 (1988) (report for the National Commission for Employment Policy). The fraction
of government expenditures for correctional privatization cannot be established precisely, how-
ever. What can fairly be said is that the growth rate of private corrections firms during the
1980's has been remarkably high.
4. Privatization can be defined quite generally as "the attainment of any public policy goal
through the participation of the private sector." Id. at 7. Although correctional privatization
most commonly comes in the form of decisions by units of government to contract with the
private sector for services it otherwise would be obliged to provide itself, privatization can be
accomplished in such other ways as the sale of government assets and the creation of voucher
systems by government which permit those receiving vouchers to procure various services from
the vendor of their choice.
5. The perceived advantages of various forms of privatization are numerous. A recent na-
tional survey revealed that 74% of the governmental entities responding emphasized cost savings
and that 33% noted improved service quality. ToucHE Ross & COMPANY, PRIVATIZATION IN
AMERICA: AN OPINION SURVEY OF CITY AND COUNTY GOVERNMENTS ON THImR UsE OF PRIVATI-
ZATION AND THEIR INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS 5 (1987). Interestingly, 340 viewed the risk sharing
feature of privatization as an important advantage of contracting out for services. Id. For a
more focused consideration of the perceived advantages of correctional privatization, see C.
CAMP & G. CAMP, PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN PRISON SERVICES AND OPERATIONS (1984);.
Logan & Rausch, Punish and Profit: The Emergence of Private Enterprise Prisons, 2 JUST. Q.
303 (1985); Mullen, Corrections and the Private Sector, 65 PRISON J. 1 (1985); Savas, Privatiza-
tion and Prisons, 40 VAND. L. REv. 889 (1987).
6. See, e.g., J. HACKETT, H. HATRY, R. LEVINSON, J. ALLEN, K. Cm, & E. FEIGENBAUM,
ISSUES IN CONTRACTING FOR THE PRIVATE OPERATION OF PRISONS AND JAILS (1987); C. LOGAN,
PRIVATE PRISONS: CONS AND PROS (1988) [hereinafter C. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS]; J. MULLEN,
K. CHABOTAR, & D. CHARROw, Ti PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS (1985); C. RING, CON-
TRACTING FOR TEI OPERATION OF PRIVATE PRISONS: PROS AND CONS (1987); I. ROBBINS, THE
LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVATE INCARCERATION (1988) [hereinafter I. ROBBINS, PRVATE INCAR-
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corrections firm under section 1983 is presently unclear. At the very
core of section 1983 litigation are the "state action" and "color-of-
state-law" requirements that permit plaintiffs to name private parties
as defendants only under limited circumstances. Notwithstanding the
United States Supreme Court's widely analyzed efforts to clarify these
requirements,7 the circumstances under which private persons or enti-
ties will encounter civil liability for constitutional torts are not easily
defined.' Uncertainty also arises when one attempts to deal with such
issues as whether employees of private corrections firms will be per-
mitted to raise the various immunity defenses presently available to
their public sector counterparts.
The objective of this Article is to provide an overview of how the
courts will most likely apply section 1983 in suits brought by inmates
in correctional facilities being managed on behalf of state and local
government by private corrections firms. 9 The first section of this
analysis reviews the historical development of section 1983. Following
a review of some of the fundamental aspects of section 1983 jurispru-
dence, the third section addresses whether and under what circum-
stances the conduct of private corrections firms will be deemed state
action, thereby qualifying the firms as section 1983 defendants. The
next section reviews the immunity defenses that are now available to
public sector employees and examines whether private correctional
employees are likely to have access to any of these defenses. The fifth
section briefly illustrates the circumstances under which an inmate in-
jured in a private corrections facility may be able to sue the contract-
ing unit of government. The final section reviews the conclusions
CERATION]; C. THOMAS, L. LANzA-KADUCE, L. CALVERT HANSON, & K. DUFFY, TiE PRIVATIZA-
TION OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS: AN ASSESSMENT OF ITS LEGAL IMPLICATIONS (1988); Kay, The
Implications of Prison Privatization on the Conduct of Prisoner Litigation Under 42 U.S. C.
Section 1983, 40 VAND. L. REV. 867 (1987); Wecht, Breaking the Code of Deference: Judicial
Review of Private Prisons, 96 YALE L.J. 815 (1987); Woolley, Prisons for Profit: Policy Consid-
erations for Government Officials, 90 DICK. L. REV. 307 (1985); Note, Inmates' Rights and the
Privatization of Prisons, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1475 (1986); Note, Private Prisons, 36 EMORY L.J.
253 (1987).
7. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988); Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
8. Recent experience with the full-scale privatization of local and state correctional facili-
ties yields little directly relevant case law. Indeed, West v. Atkins, 108 S. Ct. 2250 (1988), is the
only section 1983 case involving a private provider of correctional services that has been decided
by the United States Supreme Court. For a discussion of West, see infra text accompanying
notes 73-90.
9. Most features of this analysis will apply more generally to the fairly wide array of other
settings in which government has contracted with the private sector for services traditionally
supplied by government directly.
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reached and suggests their implications for the privatization of correc-
tions.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 1983
The origin of section 1983 as a protection against the unlawful dep-
rivation of the rights of citizens by the State dates back to the period
immediately after the Civil War and the ratification of the thirteenth,
fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion. 10 The Civil Rights Act of 1871,"1 the precursor to section 1983,12
was intended to be a civil enforcement mechanism for section one of
the fourteenth amendment. 3 The purposes of the original version of
section 1983 were at least three-fold: to negate any state laws which
sought to draw invidious distinctions between categories of citizens on
the basis of race; to provide a federal remedy for those suffering con-
stitutional deprivations in settings where state law clearly provided no
adequate remedy; and to provide a federal remedy for those suffering
constitutional deprivations in settings where state law, although argu-
ably providing an adequate remedy on its face, was inadequate as ap-
plied. 14
Only a small number of civil rights cases came before federal courts
until landmark decisions by the Supreme Court during the past three
decades significantly expanded the utility of section 1983.1 For exam-
ple, in 1960, the year before the Court's landmark decision in Monroe
v. Pape,6 there were only "287 suits filed in, or removed to, federal
district court under the federal civil rights statutes, not including suits
by or against the United States or its officers.' ' 7 Four developments
10. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 664-65 (1977).
11. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
(1982)) (Ku Klux Klan Act).
12. SeeMonelI, 436 U.S. at 665.
13. Id. This section provides that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
14. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961).
15. One commentator has suggested that section 1983 as a federal remedy "was largely
ignored for the first 70 years of its existence" and was first given its modern interpretation by
the United States Supreme Court in Hague v. Committee for Indust. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939)
(right to assemble and distribute literature protected against the states by the fourteenth amend-
ment through § 1983). Friedman, Constitutional Torts, in SECTION 1983 CIVI. RIGHTS LITIGATION
AND ATrORNEY'S FEES, 1987: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 393, 396 (Practising Law Inst. ed. 1987).
16. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
17. T. EISENBERO, CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 74 (1981).
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over the past twenty-five years, however, increased the appeal of sec-
tion 1983 to potential plaintiffs in constitutional tort cases.
The first was the Monroe decision, in which the Supreme Court
held that section 1983 provides a federal remedy independent of exist-
ing state judicial remedies.'" Coupled with the holding of Patsy v.
Board of Regents19 that available administrative remedies need not be
exhausted prior to the filing of claims under section 1983,20 the oppor-
tunity to bring claims under section 1983 increased substantially.
Second, the enactment of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award
Act of 197621 enhanced the appeal of section 1983 suits-to attorneys
in particular. Although the Supreme Court has set limits on section
1988 claims, 22 the Court's general interpretation of section 1988 has
been generous. For example, the Court has held that plaintiffs need
only "succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves
some of the benefit [the parties] sought in bringing suit ' 23 and that a
plaintiff may meet the "prevailing party test" for purposes of section
1988 when a settlement is reached before his or her federal constitu-
tional claim has been fully litigated. 24 The Court has also held that
there is no requirement that fee awards under section 1988 be propor-
tional to any damages recovered. 25
The third development is of critical significance for those concerned
with the liability of local- rather than state-level correctional facilities.
In Monell v. Department of Social Services26 the Court overruled the
18. 365 U.S. at 183.
19. 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
20. Id. at 516.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) ("In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sec-
tions 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.").
22. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S.
711 (1987) (use of various mechanisms for seeking unreasonably high attorneys' fees are not
permitted); North Carolina Dep't of Transp. v. Crest St. Community Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6
(1986) (plaintiffs who rely on available administrative mechanisms rather than on § 1983 as a
remedy may not subsequently bring a § 1983 action purely as a means of seeking to recover
attorney fees).
23. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d
275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978)).
24. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129-30 (1980). More specifically, a plaintiff meets the
"prevailing party test" when the case is settled in such a way as to affect "the behavior of the
defendant towards the plaintiff." Hewitt v. Helms, 107 S. Ct. 2672, 2676 (1987) (emphasis in
original). For a thorough consideration of the many issues presented in section 1988 cases prior
to Hewitt, see Kirklin, The Recovery of Attorney's Fees in Civil Rights Cases Pursuant to 42
U.S.C. Section 1983, in SECTION 1983 Civi. RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY'S FEas, 1987:
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 727 (Practising Law Inst. ed. 1987).
25. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 570 (1986).
26. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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portion of Monroe v. Pape&7 which held that municipalities were not
"persons" subject to suit within the meaning of section 1983.28 More
specifically, for the majority in Monell Justice Brennan wrote the fol-
lowing:
Our analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of
1871 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities
and other local government units to be included among those persons
to whom § 1983 applies. Local governing bodies, therefore, can be
sued directly under § 1983 . .. where, as here, the action that is
alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and
promulgated by that body's officers. 29
This decision is of major significance for local-level operations of
government for at least two reasons. The obvious reason is that local
units of government became suitable section 1983 defendants follow-
ing Monell. A less obvious reason is that local units of government do
not enjoy the eleventh amendment immunity from suits for monetary
damages enjoyed by their state-level counterparts.30 Thus, a very im-
portant effect of Monell was to create a "deep pocket" defendant for
an exceedingly large pool of potential plaintiffs.
Finally, in Maine v. Thiboutot,3" decided in 1980, the Court held
that section 1983 suits may be brought for deprivation of rights con-
ferred by statutes generally in addition to rights conferred by "civil-
rights" statutes.3 2 However, the Court subsequently retreated from
what initially seemed to be a generous interpretation of the range of
rights protected by section 1983. In several cases since, for instance,
the Court has held that the exclusive remedy for some violations of
federal statutes is found in those specific statutes rather than in sec-
tion 1983. 3 3 Notwithstanding these and other limitations on definitions
27. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
28. Id. at 190-91.
29. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
30. See id n.54.
31. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
32. The Court rejected a contention that "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws" language of section 1983 means only a depriva-
tion of civil rights or equal protection laws and held that it must be read more broadly. Id. at 4
(emphasis in original).
33. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (distin-
guishing between federal laws which only establish policies-thus denying § 1983 claims-and
federal laws that actually create federal rights-thus permitting § 1983 claims); Ring v. Crisp
County Hosp. Auth., 652 F. Supp. 477 (M.D. Ga. 1987) (Age Discrimination in Employment
Act provides an exclusive remedy for claims of age discrimination; consequently, such claims do
not give rise to a cause of action under § 1983.).
PRIVA TIZA TION OF PRISONS
of federal constitutional rights protected by section 1983, 34 Thiboutot
broadened the gate through which plaintiffs could move in their quest
for section 1983 remedies.
These and related developments have contributed to an enormous
growth of section 1983 cases. In 1989, for example, approximately
40,000 or more filings-roughly twenty percent of the total workload
of the federal courts-will involve alleged violations of civil rights.35 A
substantial proportion of these cases will be brought by inmates in
local jails and state prisons. 36 Indeed, the evidence reveals that the
number of civil rights suits filed by inmate plaintiffs has been rising
rapidly: data presented in a recent report show that the number of
civil rights actions filed by state inmates in 1981 was 15,639, and that
the number had increased by 46.89% during 1987 to a total of
22,972. 37
The costs to government associated with this volume of litigation
will be substantial. Thus, to the degree that private corporations could
provide a buffer for the existing liability exposure of government ei-
ther directly-for example, by including significant indemnification
clauses in their contracts with government, or indirectly-for exam-
ple, by improving the efficiency and effectiveness of correctional op-
erations and thereby decreasing the likelihood of successful inmate
suits-the benefits of privatization would be very significant.
II. FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS OF SECTION 1983 JURISPRUDENCE
The need for an overview of fundamental aspects of section 1983
actions, unfortunately, presents a broad array of problems. The cases
dealing with section 1983 are many, the substantive issues they address
reach far beyond concerns with the rights of confined persons, and,
perhaps largely because the legal standards appropriate for section
1983 cases remain unsettled, it is exceedingly difficult to derive general
principles from existing case law.3" What follows, therefore, is not an
34. See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
35. Thomas, Inmate Litigation: Using the Courts or Abusing Them?, 50 CORRECTIONS To-
DAY 124, 125-26 (1988). Importantly, the data reported do not reveal an increase in the rate with
which such actions are being brought by state inmates. The number of civil rights suits reported
for 1981 per 100 inmates is 4.69. The per 100 inmate figure for 1987 is 4.39. Id. Thus, the rise in
the total number of suits filed appears to be largely an artifact of the rapid growth in the number
of state inmates being confined rather than an increased willingness on the part of inmates to
initiate civil rights suits.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Case law in this area is complicated partially because of the diversity of specific interests
implicated by state action. The risk of error can be considerable when one encounters an issue
that has not been addressed directly within a jail or prison context by prior section 1983 cases,
and one is limited to drawing reasonable inferences from cases decided in quite dissimilar areas.
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exhaustive statement of section 1983 jurisprudence, but rather a sum-
mary of four basic principles.
First, section 1983 does not create any new substantive rights. In-
stead, it provides a legal remedy for deprivations of preexisting legal
rights found in the Constitution39 or in federal statutes that reach be-
yond a declaration of policy and do not themselves provide an exclu-
sive remedy. 40
Second, a section 1983 plaintiff need not be a "person" in the ordi-
nary sense of that term4' or a "citizen" in the legal sense of that
term.
42
Third, although the vast majority of section 1983 cases initially
come before federal district courts in accordance with one or more
provisions of federal law, 43 section 1983 claims also may be brought
before a state court.44 It is unclear why the dominant preference is for
a federal rather than a state forum. On a general level, of course, it
has long been felt that federal courts provide a more responsive forum
than do state courts for plaintiffs who wish to pursue federal constitu-
tional issues. Additionally, however, the preference for a federal fo-
rum almost surely flows from more complex tactical considerations
such as mechanisms for drawing prospective jurors in the federal ver-
sus state jurisdictions. 45
Fourth, plaintiffs prevailing under section 1983 may be granted ac-
tual damages in an amount typically determined by relevant principles
of tort law. These include nominal damages when a constitutional
deprivation causes no actual injury,6 punitive damages when there is
39. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1980).
40. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1980).
41. See, e.g., Church of Scientology v. Cazares, 638 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1981) (church
could maintain civil rights action on behalf of its members).
42. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212 (1982) (equal protection clause provides that
no state shall deny the equal protection of the laws to anyperson within its jurisdiction).
43. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. 11 1984).
44. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1980).
45. In state courts, for example, prospective jurors are often drawn from lists of registered
voters within the respective county. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 40.01 (1987). In federal court, by
contrast, prospective jurors are drawn from lists of registered voters or actual voters within the
entire district. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (1982). In addition to drawing prospective jurors from a
larger geographical area, federal courts allow sources of names other than voter registration lists
to be used where necessary to guarantee to federal litigants the right "to juries selected at ran-
dom from a fair cross section of the community." Id. § 1861. Imagine that you have been called
upon to represent an inmate plaintiff confined in a prison located in a rural county who alleges
that state correctional officials have shown a constitutionally unacceptable degree of indifference
to his or her legitimate medical needs. Obviously the interests of such a plaintiff would not be
served by bringing such a claim before a state court with a jury selected from the citizens of the
rural county in which the prison is located-a county whose largest employer might well be a
department of corrections and whose judge might well be an elected official.
46. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978).
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evidence that the defendant's conduct was "motivated by evil motive
or intent or . . .involves reckless or callous indifference to the feder-
ally protected rights of others, ' 47 and injunctive and declaratory re-
lief.4 The availability of these various forms of relief varies with the
character of the defendant as well as, of course, the character of the
constitutional injury suffered. 49
In addition to the above-described fundamental aspects of section
1983, there are two more complex dimensions to discuss: the under-
color-of-state-law requirement and the availability of immunity de-
fenses. Whether private correctional facilities will meet the under-
color-of-state-law requirement, and whether they or their employees
will be accorded some type of immunity defense, will largely shape
their liability exposure under section 1983.
III. THE UNDER-COLOR-OF-STATE-LAW AND STATE ACTION
REQUIREMENTS
The plain language of section 1983 requires that plaintiffs offer
proof that their injuries were caused by a person acting "under color
of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any
State." 50 Additionally, the remedy provided by section 1983 is avail-
able only for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities,
secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States].""' When
a plaintiff brings a section 1983 action, the plaintiff must prove that
the conduct constitutes state action as an element of the underlying
constitutional violation. In such a case, the action must not only be
taken under color of state law; it must also constitute state action for
purposes of the fourteenth amendment.5 2
The Supreme Court has not yet clarified all aspects of the relation-
ship between the section 1983 under-color-of-state-law requirement
and the fourteenth amendment state action requirement. The Court
did give some guidance, however, in its Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.53
47. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). But see City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,
453 U.S. 247 (1981) (municipality immune from punitive damages).
48. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
49. An illustration of how the remedy depends in part on the character of the defendant is
provided by section 1983 actions for monetary damages filed by state inmate plaintiffs against a
state, a state agency, or a state official being sued in his or her official capacity. Such suits are
generally barred by the eleventh amendment. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978). By contrast, suits for monetary damages are possible when they are brought
against local units of government. Id.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
51. Id.
52. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978).
53. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
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decision. The Court observed that although it had treated the two re-
quirements as identical in some of its previous cases,54 the two ele-
ments are analytically distinct." Despite this analytical distinction, the
Court concluded that conduct satisfying the fourteenth amendment
state action requirement would also satisfy the section 1983 under-
color-of-state-law requirement.16 The Court pointed out, however,
that conduct which satisfies the section 1983 under-color-of-state-law
requirement will not necessarily meet the fourteenth amendment state
action requirement.Y
Because most inmate suits are predicated on alleged violations of
constitutional rights secured by or through the fourteenth amend-
ment, the controlling question will be whether the conduct complained
of constitutes state action.18 In Lugar, the Court established a two-
part test for determining whether conduct is state action. First, "the
deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege
created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or
by a person for whom the State is responsible." 5 9 Second, "the party
charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said
to be a state actor . . . because he is a state official, because he has
acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials,
or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State."60
Prior to Lugar, the Court had developed at least four standards for
determining whether the conduct of a private actor constitutes state
action. The joint participation test focuses on the degree to which pri-
vate parties acted in concert with or conspired with government offi-
54. Id. at 928-29.
55. Id. at 935-36 n.18.
56. Id. at 934. The Court reasoned that since the predecessor statute to section 1983 was
enacted to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment, it would be inconsistent with
Congressional intent for the Court to "read the 'under color of any statute' language of the Act
in such a way as to impose a limit on these fourteenth amendment violations that may be re-
dressed by the § 1983 cause of action." Id.
57. Id. The Court's conclusion is significant in section 1983 cases predicated on constitu-
tional or statutory provisions which-unlike the fourteenth amendment-contain no state-action
requirement. As the Court recognized, in such cases the under-color-of-state-law requirement
will be "a distinct element of the case not satisfied implicitly by a finding of a violation of the
particular federal right." Id.
58. Thus, it will be unnecessary for the courts to determine whether the conduct falls within
the potentially more expansive reach of action under color of state law.
59. Id.
60. Id. Although this language appears to require a two-part analysis, the Court in Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982), did not utilize
the first prong. One commentator has suggested that the first prong might be necessary "only in
joint participation cases in which the actor becomes vested with state power only on two condi-
tions: use of state law and overt participation of state officials. Kay, supra note 6, at 879 n.55.
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cials. 6' The symbiotic relationship test directs attention toward the
overall relationship that exists between government and a private en-
tity.62 The close nexus test focuses more directly on the linkage be-
tween government and the particular actions taken by a private
entity. 63 Finally, the public function test considers whether the private
entity's role is one "traditionally associated with sovereignty." 64
Although a private corrections firm working on behalf of and under
contract with a state or local unit of government might satisfy any one
of the above four tests, 65 the public function test offers the most per-
suasive means of finding that conduct of a private corrections firm
constitutes state action. As articulated in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,66 the
public function test turns primarily on whether a private entity is per-
forming a function that "has been 'traditionally the exclusive preroga-
tive of the state." 67
In Medina v. O'Neil,68 for example, the District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, applying the public function test, held that
conduct of a private firm hired by the United States Immigration and
Naturalization Service to detain aliens on a short-term basis was state
action for the purposes of a Bivens action. 69 Although the role of the
private firm in Medina encompassed two functions "traditionally the
exclusive prerogative of the state" (immigration and detention), 70 the
opinion of the court suggests that fulfillment of the detention function
alone would have qualified the defendant's conduct as state action:
61. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144
(1970).
62. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Perez v. Sugarman, 499
F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1974).
63. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
64. Id. at 353.
65. For an application of these tests to the private corrections context, see Kay, supra note
6, at 871-880. See also Little, McPherson & Healey, Section 1983 Liability of Municipalities and
Private Entities Operating Under Color of Municipal Law, 14 STET. L. REV. 565, 571-92 (1985).
66. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
67. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982))
(emphasis in original). In Rendell-Baker the Court held that while education had traditionally
been a function of the state, it had never been an exclusive public function. Id.
68. 589 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D. Tex. 1984), vacated in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 838
F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1988). As the Court of Appeals decided there was no underlying statutory or
constitutional violation, it did not reach the state action question.
69. Id. at 1038. A Bivens action is a lawsuit against a federal actor alleging that the defen-
dant's act deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the United States Constitution. It is, essen-
tially, the federal actor counterpart of a section 1983 action; the requirement of state action is
identical. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
70. Medina, 589 F. Supp. at 1038.
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[Dietention is a power reserved to the government, and is an
exclusive prerogative of the State. As the Supreme Court stated,
"[w]hile as a factual matter any person with sufficient physical
power may deprive a person of his [life, liberty or] property, only a
state or private person whose action may be fairly treated as that of
the State itself may deprive him of an interest encompassed within
the [Fifth or] Fourteenth Amendment's protection.'"'
The court in Medina, in addition to considering the government's tra-
ditionally exclusive role in involuntary detention, emphasized that the
government authorized the contracting firm to detain suspected illegal
aliens generally and ordered the firm to detain these suspects in partic-
ular. 72
A private corrections scenario would appear to encompass all three
circumstances. The contracting facility would be fulfilling a tradition-
ally exclusive governmental role, the government would authorize the
private facility to detain generally by the terms of the contract, and
the government would in essence order the facility to detain particular
inmates by sentencing them. Based on the facts of Medina, a private
corrections facility would thus appear to satisfy the public function
test. Consequently, its conduct would be considered state action for
the purposes of section 1983.
To the extent the underlying constitutional violation is a failure to
provide constitutionally mandated services, the Supreme Court's re-
cent holding in West v. Atkins 73 supports this conclusion as well. In
West, the Supreme Court addressed the question whether the conduct
of private physicians working under contract to units of government
in correctional settings was conduct "under color of state law" and
therefore state action for the purposes of section 1983.14 The Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals had been at odds with the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals regarding this question. 71 In Ancata v. Prison
71. Id. at 1038 (quoting Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978)) (citations and
quotations omitted).
72. Id. at 1039.
73. 108 S. Ct. 2250 (1988).
74. Id. at 2252. Although the Court framed its analysis in terms of "under color of state
law," in the opinion's concluding paragraph the Court stated that "we conclude that respon-
dent's delivery of medical treatment to West was state action." Id. at 2260. Thus, the decision
may be read as ultimately grounded on a finding of state action.
75. Compare West v. Atkins, 815 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2250 (1988)
and Calvert v. Sharp, 748 F.2d 861 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1132 (1985) with Ort
v. Pinchback, 786 F.2d 1105 (1 1th Cir. 1986) and Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., 769 F.2d 700
(11th Cir. 1985). Before the United States Supreme Court decided West, other federal circuits
had implicitly concluded that prison physicians may act under color of state law. See West v.
Atkins, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 2254 n.7 (1988) (citing Miranda v. Munoz, 770 F.2d 255 (1st Cir. 1985);
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Health Services,76 relying in large measure on Estelle v. Gamble,77 the
Eleventh Circuit had held that the conduct of a private provider of
medical services to inmates satisfied the under-color-of-state-law re-
quirement. 7 The Fourth Circuit, relying most directly on its own pre-
vious holding in Calvert v. Sharp,79 had held to the contrary in West
v. Atkins. 0 To reach this quite strained holding, the Fourth Circuit
began by noting that in Polk County v. Dodson"t the Supreme Court
held that attorneys working for the state as public defenders did not
meet the under-color-of-state-law requirement and thus could not be
named as defendants in section 1983 actions."' Largely ignoring that
this prior Supreme Court holding was grounded almost entirely on a
recognition that public defenders are in an adversarial position to the
state as a matter of professional obligation,83 the Fourth Circuit
sought to create what amounted to an exception for an ambiguously
defined class of professional persons who work under contract with
units of government. The apparent definition of the class would be
those professional persons who retain the power to exercise their best
professional judgment and who exercise no custodial or supervisory
control over inmates. s4
In West, a unanimous Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit.8"
Instead of looking at whether the actors were state employees at the
time they were alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation, the
Court focused on the nature of the service any person, whether a pub-
lic or a private employee, was charged with providing at the time of
an alleged deprivation.8 6 If the service was one the state itself was con-
stitutionally mandated to provide and the state merely chose to meet
Norris v. Frame, 585 F.2d 1183 (3d Cir. 1978); Murrell v. Bennett, 615 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1980);
Byrd v. Wilson, 701 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1983); Duncan v. Duckworth, 644 F.2d 653 (7th Cir.
1981); Kelsey v. Ewing, 652 F.2d 4 (8th Cir. 1981)).
76. 769 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1985).
77. 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (deliberate indifference to the medical needs of inmates violated the
constitutional rights accorded inmates by the eighth and fourteenth amendments).
78. Ancata, 769 F.2d at 703.
79. 748 F.2d 861 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1132 (1985).
80. 815 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2250 (1988).
81. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
82. West, 815 F.2d at 995.
83. Polk County, 454 U.S. at 320.
84. In Calvert v. Sharp, 748 F.2d 861 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1132 (1985),
for example, the court described a private physician working under contract in a Maryland
prison as one who "did not have any custodial or supervisory duties" and whose obligation
"was not to the mission of the state but to treat patients referred to him by other physicians."
Id. at 864. The court then concluded that he therefore "did not act under color of state law."
Id.
85. West v. Atkins, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (1988).
86. Id. at 2259.
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its obligation via contracting with a private entity for the service, then
those providing the service acted under color of state law for purposes
of section 1983.87 More specifically, the Court observed that:
It is the physician's function within the state system, not the precise
terms of his employment, that determines whether his actions can
fairly be attributed to the State .... [Clontracting out prison
medical care does not relieve the State of its constitutional duty to
provide adequate medical treatment to those in its custody, and it
does not deprive the State's prisoners of the means to vindicate their
Eighth Amendment rights.8 1
Although West directly addressed only the question of whether pri-
vate physicians working under contract to provide medical services to
state inmates satisfies the section 1983 under-color-of state-law re-
quirement, it appears to follow from this holding that under some cir-
cumstances the conduct of private correctional employees would
subject those employees, and, under appropriate circumstances, their
employers,8 9 to liability for constitutional torts. Those who are invol-
untarily confined in local jails while awaiting trial or serving sentences
and those who are confined in state prisons following conviction are
constitutionally entitled to various types of services-including ade-
quate food, proper medical care, and sufficient space in which to
live.90 When and if the types or levels of services that the state is con-
stitutionally mandated to provide are not provided, it appears that
those who encounter such deprivations can turn to section 1983 in
their quest for a legal remedy.
87. Id.
88. Id. In addition, the Court observed that "the State bore an affirmative obligation to
provide adequate medical care to West; the State delegated that function to respondent Atkins;
and respondent voluntarily assumed that obligation by contract." Id. This emphasis on what the
State is obliged to do, and by logical implication what the State is obliged to refrain from doing,
is at the core of the Court's holding. Whether the State discharges its responsibilities to inmates
itself or via the actions of a private entity with whom it has formed a contractual relationship
should not be dispositive as to whether inmates have a cause of action under section 1983-
although it might be quite relevant when considering against whom an action might be brought.
89. Plaintiffs may not predicate a section 1983 action on absolute liability, vicarious liabil-
ity, or respondeat superior theories. There is no reason to believe that such prohibitions would
be lifted merely because a section 1983 suit was brought against a private person or entity whose
relationship with a unit of government was sufficient to qualify it as a state actor. Thus, the
section 1983 liability of a private correctional employee would not in and of itself establish the
liability of the employee's employer.
90. The view, advanced many years ago in Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.)
790 (1871), that an inmate is nothing more than a "slave of the State," Id. at 796, whose consti-
tutional rights vanish as he or she walks through the gates of a jail or prison, is no longer held.
Consequently, rights secured by various constitutional provisions, while subject to significant
limitations, cannot be abridged by either public or private prison officials.
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IV. AVAILABIITY OF IMMUNITY DEFENSES UNDER SECTION 1983
Although section 1983 has no immunity provisions, governmental
defendants have traditionally been accorded some type of immunity
from suit. It is presently unclear whether these immunity defenses will
be extended to private corrections firms or their employees.
A. Availability of Immunity Defenses to Governmental Defendants
A consideration of selected defenses and immunities available to
section 1983 defendants is a sometimes awkward and complex task.
Part of the reason for this complexity is that some categories of gov-
ernment actors are absolutely immune from suit-such as judges, 9'
certain limited categories of persons who exercise quasi-judicial pow-
ers, 92 prosecutors, 9 parole officials, 94 and witnesses. 95 Many more cat-
egories of government actors-including, under most circumstances,
police officers and correctional officers-enjoy a qualified rather than
an absolute immunity from suit. 96
Another reason for the complexity is the variety of circumstances
under which attention focuses on the character of the activity rather
than on the position of the person engaging in the activity. In the re-
cent case of Arteaga v. State,97 for example, the initiation of discipli-
nary proceedings by state correctional officers was held to be a quasi-
judicial act and the officers were thus shielded from suit by absolute
immunity.9 However narrow the value of cases like Arteaga may
prove to be, the fact remains that the Supreme Court recently has fa-
vored a close analysis of the functions performed by officials and how
those functions would be enhanced or diminished via officials' being
accorded access to an immunity defense. 99
Finally, the matter is further complicated because section 1983 con-
tains no provision for any kind of immunity. Nevertheless, the availa-
91. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); see Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the His-
tory of Judicial Immunity, 1980 DUKE L.J. 879.
92. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
93. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
94. Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102 (1981).
95. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983).
96. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
97. 72 N.Y.2d 212, 527 N.E.2d 1194, 532 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1988).
98. 72 N.Y.2d at 214, 527 N.E.2d at 1195, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 58. But see Cleavinger v. Sax-
ner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985) (prison disciplinary committee members entitled to a qualified good
faith immunity defense but not to absolute immunity); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986)
(police arrest decisions protected from suit by qualified good faith immunity but not by absolute
immunity).
99. See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193
(1985).
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bility of absolute or qualified immunity from suit flows from the
frequently expressed view of the Supreme Court that "members of the
42d Congress were familiar with common-law principles, including de-
fenses previously recognized in ordinary tort litigation, and ... they
likely intended these common-law principles to obtain [in section 1983
actions], absent specific provisions to the contrary."100
1. Individual Immunities
Individual immunity is granted only in those circumstances where
overriding public policy considerations mandate that officials be
shielded from personal liability to ensure their ability to perform their
duties. This type of immunity may be either absolute or qualified.
Traditionally, the privilege of absolute immunity functioned as a com-
plete defense that entitled government officials to a summary judg-
ment subject only to the requirement that their actions were within the
scope of official duties. 10' Absolute immunity is thus granted in only a
few limited cases. Federal legislative and executive officials sued in
their individual capacities are protected by an absolute common law
immunity. 02 A more modest number of state and local level officials
sued in their individual capacities are protected by absolute immu-
nity. 03
There is, however, a clear shift toward limiting the circumstances
under which either absolute or qualified immunity will be granted.' °4
100. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258 (1981).
101. Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2914
(1988).
102. Although federal actors cannot be named as plaintiffs in a section 1983 claim, they are
viable targets under other tort theories. Consequently, the immunity status of federal actors has
been included in this analysis. Article I, section 6 of the United States Constitution-the speech
and debate clause-affords absolute federal legislative immunity only for purely legislative func-
tions. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Browning v. Clerk of U.S. House of Representa-
tives, 789 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 996 (1986). But see Chastain, 833 F.2d at
312 (congressmen not absolutely immune from suit for tort alleged to have been committed dur-
ing the course of official duty but outside the scope of the speech or debate clause immunity).
Additionally, although not founded in specific constitutional provisions, executive immunity has
been recognized at common law and through judicial decisions. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 731 (1982) (President has absolute immunity from civil liability for his official acts).
103. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity
from claims for damages for prosecutorial acts within scope of their duties); Tenney v. Bran-
dhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (absolute legislative immunity extended to state legislators while per-
forming legitimate legislative acts); Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1983) (absolute
legislative immunity granted to local legislators). But see Williams v. Anderson, 562 F.2d 1081
(8th Cir. 1977) (school board member denied absolute immunity); Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d
1090 (5th Cir. 1975) (county supervisor denied absolute immunity).
104. For example, judges' traditional enjoyment of absolute immunity, once thought neces-
sary to promote uninhibited judicial decision-making, see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349
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The granting of immunity, to be more specific, requires the presence
of the following two elements: (1) a showing that the immunity being
asserted was recognized at common law, and (2) evidence demonstrat-
ing that a strong public policy interest will be served by an immunity
award. 105 With respect to the second element, the Supreme Court has
emphasized the following two public policy concerns:
(1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of
subjecting to liability an officer who is required, by the legal
obligation of his position, to exercise discretion; (2) the danger that
the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to execute his
office with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public
good. 106
In any event, the most common level of immunity afforded is that of
a qualified immunity, 0 which the Supreme Court has extended to
high-level state officials.108
Harlow v. Fitzgerald'O9 expanded the scope of the qualified immu-
nity defense available to government officials charged with a constitu-
tional violation of civil rights actions for damages. 10 It did so by
abolishing the previously accepted "subjective test" set forth in Wood
v. Strickland."' Under the subjective test, immunity from personal li-
ability for monetary damages was not recognized if the actions taken
were malicious or if the official knew or should have known that the
actions abridged a protected right. 112 The new standard enunciated in
Harlow is that "government officials performing discretionary func-
tions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitu-
(1978) (state court judge absolutely immune from liability for issuing an order for sterilization),
has been somewhat curtailed. See Guercio v. Brody, 814 F.2d 1115 (6th Cir.) (immunity granted
only for acts involving judicial discretion and not for those acts administrative in nature), aff'd,
823 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 749 (1988).
105. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239-40 (1973).
106. Id. at 240.
107. This type of immunity was first raised in the context of civil rights litigation in Pierson
v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), where the Court permitted a police officer to raise the common law
defense of qualified good faith immunity against a claim of unconstitutional arrest of civil rights
workers. The Court held that Congress did not intend section 1983 to abrogate the common law
immunities traditionally afforded government officials. Id. at 554.
108. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (granting the governor of Ohio a qualified
immunity for his decision to deploy National Guard troops to the Kent State campus during the
Vietnam demonstrations).
109. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
110. Id.at818.
111. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
112. Id. at 322.
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tional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."" 3 The
adoption of this objective standard test, a question of law to be re-
solved by the court, represented a radical change from prior law in
which the subjective standard was a mixed question of fact to be re-
solved by the jury and of law to be resolved by the court.' 1 4 Although
Harlow concerned the level of immunity to be afforded a federal offi-
cial, the Court in dicta stated that the same level of immunity would
apply to a state official sued for a constitutional violation under sec-
tion 1983."15
The availability of qualified good faith immunity to prison officials
has been recognized in cases such as Procunier v. Navarette"6 and
Cleavinger v. Saxner."7 The Court in Procunier, for example, held
that prison officials were not entitled to immunity "if the constitu-
tional right allegedly infringed by them was clearly established at the
time of their challenged conduct, if they knew or should have known
of that right, and if they knew or should have known that their con-
duct violated the. constitutional norm."" 8 Because the constitutional
right involved had not been established at the time the defendants
acted, a qualified good faith immunity was available." 9 In King v.
Higgins,12 0 however, the First Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a
prison official was not shielded by qualified immunity when the offi-
cial reasonably should have known that the inmate was entitled to due
process which he did not receive.' 2' In another First Circuit case de-
cided on immunity grounds, the court disallowed the defense of quali-
fied immunity, determining that the warden-a state prison official-
would not be liable for a "merely negligent failure to act.' 12  The of-
ficial, however, could be held liable for a failure to act that reflected a
"reckless or callous indifference to the rights and safety of the prison-
ers in his charge.' '1 23 The good faith or qualified immunity defense
113. 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 815-18.
115. Id. at 818 n.30. After acknowledging that Harlow raised no issue concerning the immu-
nity of state officials, the Court stated it had "found previously, however, that it would be
'untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against
state officials under Section 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against fed-
eral officials."' Id. (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978)).
116. 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
117. 474 U.S. 193 (1985). See Note, Constitutional Law-Absolute Versus Qualified Immu-
nity for Federal Prison Officials-Cleavinger v. Saxner, 22 WAE FoREST L. REV. 277 (1987).
118. 434 U.S. 555, 562 (1978).
119. Id. at 563.
120. 702 F.2d 18 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 965 (1983).
121. Id. at 20.
122. Clark v. Taylor, 710 F.2d 4, 9 (1st Cir. 1983).
123. Id. (citing Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983)).
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has also been afforded to sheriffs,1 24 jailers,' 25 and police officers 2 6
acting in their individual capacities.
2. Lack of Municipal Immunity
The landmark case concerning municipal immunity is Monell v. De-
partment of Social Services,27 which held that a municipal social
services department was not entitled to absolute immunity from a sec-
tion 1983 claim. Local governing bodies, the Court concluded, can be
sued directly under section 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunc-
tive relief where "the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional im-
plements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or
decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's offi-
cers."1 28
Two years after Monell, in Owen v. City of Independence,129 the
Supreme Court ruled that the good faith immunity defense also was
unavailable to municipalities. 30 The Court noted that although both
judicial and legislative immunity were rooted in common law, munici-
pal immunity was not.' 3' As the Court explained, "neither history nor
policy supports a construction of § 1983 that would justify ... quali-
fied immunity.' 3 2 The justification offered in support of immunity
was that the unavailability of a good faith defense would compel mu-
nicipal officials to adopt practices and procedures to minimize "unin-
tentional infringements of constitutional rights" and to prevent
situations in which "many victims of municipal malfeasance would be
left remediless if the city were also allowed to assert a good-faith de-
fense," thereby disavowing liability for injuries it may have caused. 133
An obvious implication of this lack of immunity available to local
governmental entities is an increased exposure to litigation from the
operation of jails and correctional facilities. Circumstances exist
124. See Turner v. Raynes, 611 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 900 (1980).
125. See Fowler v. Cross, 635 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1981).
126. See Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987) (qualified immunity available to
police officers in the field as a defense to a fourth amendment warrantless search challenge).
127. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
128. Id. at 690. Under Monell, local governments are held liable for unconstitutional acts
that occur pursuant to "a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by
those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy." Id. at 694.
129. 445 U.S. 622 (1979).
130. Id. at 638.
131. Id. at 646-47.
132. Id. at 638.
133. Id. at 651-52. Accord Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (although
qualified immunity defense could be enjoyed by an individual officer, defense could not shield
local units of government from liability).
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where the acts of the individual sued in his official capacity impute
liability to the county. In Blackburn v. Snow, 3 4 for example, the
court declined to grant qualified immunity to a sheriff who instituted
a policy requiring all jail visitors to subject themselves to body cavity
strip searches, a policy held to be objectively unreasonable and viola-
tive of the fourth amendment. 135 Moreover, the court upheld a dam-
age award of $177,040 against the county by reasoning that the
sheriff's strip search constituted county policy because the sheriff was
a county official elected by county voters to act on their behalf and to
"exercise the powers created by state law." 136
3. Sovereign Immunity for States
A discussion of state immunities requires at least a brief mention of
the role of sovereign immunity, which, following Martinez v. Califor-
nia,'3 7 has been of little or no significance in the section 1983 context.
The role of the eleventh amendment, which bars a citizen's suit for
monetary damages against a state in federal court, 31 is more impor-
tant. Although the fundamental purpose of the eleventh amendment is
to preserve the state's sovereignty and to protect the state treasury, 13 9
there nevertheless are two ways in which a damage suit can be brought
against a state in federal court. First, a state can consent to be sued
and thus waive its sovereign immunity.' Second, Congress can super-
sede eleventh amendment immunity. 141 Section 1983, however, does
not constitute a clearly focused remedy intended to override the elev-
enth amendment. 142 The protection of state immunity does not shield
134. 771 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1985).
135. Id. at 569.
136. Id. at 571. See also Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1986) (sheriff not entitled to
good faith immunity, and the county could also be held liable for body cavity strip searches of
arrestees because the sheriff, the highest ranking law enforcement officer in the county, estab-
lished the policy at the county level), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3263 (1987).
137. 444 U.S. 277 (1980) (while state immunity statute can be validly applied to tort claims
arising under state law, statute would not control a § 1983 action even in cases where the § 1983
claim was being raised in the state court).
138. See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v.
Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
139. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (barring suit against a state officer to
enforce the state's statutory duty to pay improperly withheld welfare benefits as payment could
be made only from state treasury).
140. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 768.14 (1987) (suit by the state to recover tort damages waives
sovereign immunity from liability to the extent of permitting the defendant to counterclaim for
damages resulting from the same transaction or occurrence).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343, 1349 (1987) (1968 Superfund
Amendment and Reauthorization Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(D) (West Supp. 1987), "clearly
abrogates the states' 11 th Amendment immunity from private suit.").
142. See Quern v Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979).
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state agencies from significant financial risks, however. Injunctive re-
lief, which may impose considerable requirements on states, is avail-
able to state inmates despite the protections of the eleventh
amendment. 1
43
B. Availability of Immunity Defenses to Private Corrections Firms
Resolution of the immunity issue could have a significant effect on
costs of insurance, litigation, settlement, and damage awards in ac-
tions by inmates against private corrections facilities. Any effort to
forecast how this problem ultimately will be resolved, however, is nec-
essarily speculative, as the immunity issue has engendered conflict
among the federal circuit courts of appeals. 44 Although the United
States Supreme Court recognized the likelihood of conflict as early as
1982,14 it has not yet addressed the issue directly.
Notwithstanding this diversity of opinion, it is our best judgment
that the Supreme Court ultimately will resolve the present controversy
by permitting private correctional firms and their employees to assert
a qualified good faith immunity defense. We find the reasoning in
cases which suggest a contrary conclusion to be flawed in that it relies
far too rigidly on whether the common law accorded private defen-
dants any immunity from suit. In Duncan v. Peck,146 for example,
Judge Kennedy flatly asserted that:
[pirivate parties do not face the dilemma of being required by law to
use their discretion in a way that might unfairly expose them to
lawsuits . . . [and] a private party is governed only by self-interest
and is not invested with the responsibility of executing the duties of a
public official in the public interest. 147
Duncan, however, presented a set of facts quite unlike those one
would encounter in a correctional context. '4 Additionally, Judge Ken-
nedy was focusing narrowly on the issues which came before him on
appeal.
143. See id.
144. Compare Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1986) and Downs v.
Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978) with Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin,
851 F.2d 1321 (11th Cir. 1988) (en banc) and Watertown Equip. Co. v. Norwest Bank Water-
town, N.A., 830 F.2d 1487 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1723 (1988).
145. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 942 n.23 (1982).
146. 844 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir. 1988).
147. Id. at 1264.
148. Duncan filed a section 1983 suit in the hope that a federal district court would enjoin
execution of a default judgment and award damages associated with what Duncan claimed was
an unlawfully executed prejudgment attachment of certain property. Id. at 1263.
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A better approach, suggested by Forrester v. White 49 and Cleavin-
ger v. Saxner,'50 is for less attention to be accorded the common-law
status of private parties regarding immunity from suit and for more
attention to be accorded the functions rather than the official status
of those who seek to raise a qualified good faith immunity defense. 5'
In Forrester the Court recognized once again that it "has been cau-
tious in recognizing claims that government officials should be free of
the obligation to answer for their acts in court."'15 2 The Court went on
to note, however, that in relevant immunity cases one finds "a 'func-
tional' approach to immunity questions other than those that have
been decided by express constitutional or statutory enactment." '53 Ac-
cording to the Court, this approach requires an examination of "the
functions with which a particular official or class of officials has been
lawfully entrusted"15 4 and a determination of "the effect that expo-
sure to particular forms of liability would likely have on the appropri-
ate exercise of those functions." 155
To be sure, the relevant Supreme Court cases have involved public
officials rather than private persons working under contract with gov-
ernment. Forrester, for example, involved a suit brought against a
state court judge5 6 and Cleavinger involved a Bivens action brought
against officials of a federal prison.' Nevertheless, it is widely recog-
nized that private firms which provide correctional services are serving
a function that previously has been exclusively served by government
itself and that government would be obliged to provide in the absence
of a private alternative. 158 We concur entirely with this view and are
persuaded that the same public policy rationale advanced by the Su-
preme Court in all of its recent good faith immunity cases will be re-
lied upon in an unaltered form in any future cases involving the
availability of this defense to private correctional firms and their em-
ployees.
149. 108 S. Ct. 538 (1988).
150. 474 U.S. 193 (1985).
151. The logic advanced here might not necessarily be limited to the availability of a quali-
fied good faith immunity defense. If, for instance, a private provider of correctional services
were charged by the terms of a contract with handling various phases of disciplinary processes
that had a quasi-judicial character, the presence of such a contractually-based duty might well
result in private employees and the private provider enjoying absolute immunity. See, e.g.,
Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 97 (1987).




156. Id. at 541.
157. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 198 (1985).
158. See I. RoBBINs, PRIVATE INCARCERATION, supra note 6, at 82-119.
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Consider, for example, the typical setting involving a private correc-
tions firm. Correctional officers working on behalf of the firm often
are defined by statute in such a way as to impose on them the same
legal rights and obligations as their counterparts in the public sector.
Such private employees have an obligation to exercise their best pro-
fessional judgment and discretion, and the same is true of the firms
which employ them. The threat of suit clearly could create a danger
that the private employees and firm itself would be deterred from dis-
charging their responsibilities with "the decisiveness and the judgment
required by the public good." 5 9
Such circumstances have formed a persuasive rationale for accord-
ing private actors immunity defenses ordinarily reserved exclusively
for government officials. In DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Ma-
son Co., 16° for example, the court observed that "not to allow immu-
nity here [to private defendants] places defendants between Scylla and
Charybdis-potentially liable either to plaintiffs for obeying the con-
tract, or to governmental bodies for breaching it. ' 161 The DeVargas
court consequently held that "when private party defendants act in
accordance with the duties imposed by a contract with a governmental
body, perform a governmental function, and are sued solely on the
basis of those acts performed pursuant to contract, qualified immu-
nity is proper."'6
Importantly, even if private defendants are accorded the right to
raise a qualified good faith immunity defense, private corrections
firms and their employees would not automatically be in a position to
raise such a defense whenever a plaintiff brought a section 1983 suit
against them. Instead, the private corrections firms would'bear the
burden of showing that the actions challenged by plaintiffs were ac-
tions taken by the private corrections firms within the scope of their
contractual obligations to government. For example, if plaintiffs were
to allege that discretionary acts taken by a private firm were not
merely reflections of an effort to comply with contractually-imposed
obligations and were instead directed at enhancing corporate profits,
the likelihood of the private defendant's being able to assert an immu-
nity defense would probably be quite low. 163
159. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
160. 844 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1988).
161. Id. at 722 (citation omitted). The court in DeVargas, however, indicated it was not
addressing the propriety of according private correctional firms access to an immunity defense.
Id. at n.ll.
162. Id. (citations omitted).
163. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 6, at 883-88, cited in DeVargas, 844 F.2d at 722 n.11.
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Access by private defendants to a qualified good faith immunity de-
fense is, of course, but one of the issues which must be confronted
when interpreting the similarities between public and private sector
providers of correctional services. One also must determine whether
other immunities enjoyed by government-absolute immunity, sover-
eign immunity, and eleventh amendment immunity-will have a pri-
vate sector counterpart. Any predictions one might make in these
areas are especially speculative given the present state of available case
law. A quite preliminary judgment, however, is that there is no basis
for private corrections firms' being accorded any eleventh amendment
immunity from suits for monetary damages under section 1983. There
is also little likelihood that any sovereign immunity defenses a state
may enjoy will flow via the terms of a contract to a private entity.
If there is an issue in this general area that might give rise to serious
litigation, it would appear to involve the possibility that private firms
and their employees would be accorded absolute immunity from suit
under some very narrowly defined circumstances of the type presented
in cases such as Arteaga v. State.' 64 For example, were an inmate
plaintiff to challenge a discretionary decision made by private correc-
tional officials to initiate or refuse to initiate a disciplinary hearing, it
might be argued that such discretionary, quasi-judicial acts are im-
mune from suit even though they were the acts of private rather than
public employees. However, given recent decisions of the United
States Supreme Court in such relevant cases as Cleavinger v. Saxner 65
and Malley v. Briggs,'66 it is unlikely that this argument will prevail.
In Cleavinger the Court held that members of disciplinary committees
in federal facilities could raise a qualified good faith but not an abso-
lute immunity defense; 67 in Malley the Court reached the same con-
clusion regarding the defenses available to police officers making
arrest decisions. 68 Thus, if the argument for absolute immunity were
made with regard to some functions performed by private correctional
employees, the scope of any supportive holdings would be very nar-
row.
V. ILLUSTRATION OF AN UNRESOLVED ISSUE
Where all of this leaves us is only partly clear. It appears that pri-
vate corrections firms will be suitable section 1983 defendants under
164. 72 N.Y.2d 212, 527 N.E.2d 1194, 532 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1988).
165. 474 U.S. 193 (1985).
166. 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
167. Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 206.
168. Malley, 475 U.S. at 343.
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at least some circumstances. It also appears likely that a good faith
immunity defense will be made available to these private parties.
However, at least one question remains: will an inmate injured in a
private jail or facility be able to sue the contracting governmental en-
tity? In other words, under what circumstances will "the risk trans-
mitted down from the municipality to the private entity . .. be
transmitted back [to] the municipality"?' 69
The most helpful analytical framework is one the United States Su-
preme Court has developed for determining when a municipality may
be held liable under section 1983.170 This analytical framework has
been constructed on the understanding that "municipal liability is lim-
ited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible . . .
that is, [for] acts which the municipality has officially sanctioned or
ordered."'' A governmental entity is responsible under section 1983
"when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made
by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may be fairly said to
represent official policy[,] inflicts the injury.' ' 7 2 An inmate plaintiff
seeking to sue a governmental entity for a constitutional deprivation
suffered in a private correctional facility would have to show such an
affirmative link between the governmental entity and the injury suf-
fered.
169. Little, McPherson, & Healy, supra note 65, at 592. Although the focus of the above
analysis was exclusively on municipal-level applications of section 1983, substantially identical
issues would arise when state-level units of government contract with private corrections firms.
Differences in how section 1983 suits would be resolved when state-level contracts are at issue,
however, would be non-trivial. The eleventh amendment immunity available to states, for exam-
ple, precludes inmate plaintiffs from seeking monetary or punitive damage awards, but there
appears to be no reason why an inmate who suffered a constitutional deprivation proximately
caused by a private corrections firm working under contract for a state department of correc-
tions could not sue the private firm for monetary and punitive damages under appropriate cir-
cumstances.
170. Although this framework is generally used in the context of imputing liability from an
employee of government to government itself, at least one commentator has applied it to the
present question. See id. at 592-600. Considerable care must be exercised in interpreting the
scope of this dimension of section 1983 jurisprudence, especially regarding claims that inade-
quate training or supervision have established a foundation for a suit under section 1983. See,
e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989) (inadequacy of police training establishes
basis for § 1983 liability only when failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to consti-
tutional rights of citizens); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (the mere right of a supervisor
to control and direct the activities of a subordinate does not in and of itself provide the founda-
tion for a § 1983 claim, but the right of control coupled with an "affirmative link" between the
misconduct of employees and the acts or omissions of a supervisor does give rise to liability on
the part of the supervisor).
171. Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986) (footnote omitted). Accordingly, a
section 1983 action against a governmental entity cannot be predicated on a theory of vicarious
liability or respondeat superior. Id.
172. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
958 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW [Vol. 16:933
Because of the paucity of relevant cases and the conceptual prob-
lems one confronts, we will illustrate the issue by distinguishing be-
tween what we believe will be the typical and atypical section 1983
cases which could arise within a private correctional facility. In the
typical case one could envision an inmate in such a facility encounter-
ing a constitutional deprivation as a consequence of a private correc-
tional employee's act or failure to act. Such a case might involve the
private correctional employee's showing a deliberate indifference to
the medical needs of the inmate despite the fact that the contract dele-
gating the government's correctional function to the private firm
called for the provision of adequate medical services to all inmates. 73
On the strength of West v. Atkins, 74 it appears that the inmate
could bring an action against the private employee whose deliberate
indifference caused the injury and, if the deliberate indifference to his
or her medical needs could be attributed to the private employer with-
out relying upon a respondeat superior theory, to the private employer
as well. Of course, the contracting unit of government would not be
subject to suit under section 1983 based on a respondeat superior the-
ory. 7 In order to sue the contracting governmental entity, the inmate
plaintiff would be required to show that the private correctional em-
ployee's act or failure to act flowed from a "custom, policy or prac-
tice" of the governmental entity. In this instance, because the contract
called for the private correctional facility to provide adequate medical
care to all inmates, it would appear that liability for suit under section
1983 would not reach the contracting unit of government.
For the atypical case, assume that the terms of a contract between a
contracting unit of government and a private corrections firm obli-
gated the private firm to assume responsibility for all persons commit-
ted to one of its facilities.' 76 Further assume that as a consequence the
private firm was required to house significantly more inmates than the
173. Critics of the privatization movement could easily imagine precisely such a situation. A
general problem they see with privatizing correctional facilities is linked to the negative ramifica-
tions perceived in private firms' seeking to maximize profits with the effect of undermining the
welfare of inmates. Thus, opponents might well hypothesize that a private firm might establish a
custom, policy, or practice in the medical service area that would reflect a deliberate indifference
to the medical needs of inmates in their facilities. Were this to happen, clearly an inmate plain-
tiff would have a cause of action against the private firm itself.
174. 108 S. Ct. 2250 (1988).
175. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinatti, 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
176. This is not an uncommon contractual provision. Indeed, it is favored by both contract-
ing units of government and private firms because it places complete control over commitment
decisions exclusively in the hands of government. Such provisions preclude private firms from,
among other things, selecting only those potential inmates they feel will cause them the fewest
problems, a selection process often referred to as "creaming."
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involved facility was designed to hold. As a result, assume that the
facility became so overcrowded that one or more inmates brought a
section 1983 suit in which it was alleged that conditions in the facility
abridged rights secured by the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
Would the inmate plaintiff be able to sue the private corrections firm,
the contracting unit of government, or both the private firm and the
unit of government?
The unconstitutional overcrowding would appear to flow directly
from both the action taken by the private corrections firm which ac-
cepted responsibility for an excessive number of inmates and from a
"custom, policy, or practice" of the contracting unit of government
which expressed its policy decision in the language of its contract with
the private firm. The important distinction between this atypical situa-
tion and the typical situation, of course, is that in this atypical situa-
tion a contracting unit of government would have caused a
constitutional deprivation by its formal policy decision and therefore
would appear to be liable for suit under section 1983. Whether any
such liability would activate the indemnification clauses that are rou-
tinely incorporated into contracts between private firms and units of
government would depend, of course, on the actual language of such
indemnification clauses.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Notwithstanding the substantial appeal privatization has had to de-
cisionmakers at all levels of government over the course of the past
two decades or so, the relatively recent interest in privatizing adult
correctional facilities has spawned an unusually heated debate. Oppo-
nents of correctional privatization have suggested that the liability ex-
posure of government will expand significantly if government elects to
contract with the private sector for the partial or complete privatiza-
tion of correctional facilities.' Proponents of privatization have re-
sponded to this criticism by contending that corporate liability
exposure will be minimized via the ability of the private firms to pro-
vide superior services more efficiently than does government and that
the governmental liability exposure will be minimized to an even
greater degree via the inclusion of liberal indemnification clauses in
privatization contracts.' 78 Opponents and proponents agree, however,
that the major source of liability exposure for privatized correctional
operations will flow from suits brought by inmate plaintiffs under sec-
tion 1983.
177. See, e.g., I. ROBBINS, PRIVATE INCARCERATION, supra note 6.
178. See, e.g., C. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS, supra note 6.
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Precisely how the relevant provisions of law will be applied in suits
brought by inmate plaintiffs against private corrections firms under
section 1983 is unclear at this time. Nevertheless, several conclusions
can be drawn. First, whether inmates will be able to bring section 1983
actions against a private correctional facility will depend on whether
the conduct of the private facility is deemed state action and therefore
action under color of state law. As previously discussed, the conduct
should be considered state action under the public function test. The
Supreme Court's decision in West v. Atkins 179 supports this conclu-
sion at least to the extent that the underlying violation is a failure to
provide constitutionally mandated services. Second, the private facili-
ties are unlikely to be accorded anything more protective than a quali-
fied good faith immunity. Finally, as briefly illustrated here, whether
a contracting unit of government may be held liable under section
1983 for a constitutional deprivation suffered by an inmate in a pri-
vate corrections facility will most likely depend on whether the injury
flowed from the private facility's execution of a governmental policy
or custom.
The fact that private firms are capable of and likely to supply equal
or greater quality correctional services 8 ° should reduce concerns by
opponents of privatization regarding increased risks of legal liability.
Consequently, to the degree that government exercises due caution in'
the selection of independent contractors and is equally prudent in its
monitoring of compliance with its contracts, the liability risks and
costs of government, if they move in any direction, should decrease.' 1
179. 108 S. Ct. 2250 (1988).
180. The research literature available at this time, in addition to suggesting that private firms
can provide equal or greater quality correctional services than can government, indicates that
private corrections firms can do so at a lower cost. See, e.g., C. CAMP & G. CAMP, PRIVATE
SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN PRIsoN SERVICES AND OPERAaIONS (1984); Brakel, "Privatization" in
Corrections: Radical Prison Chic or Mainstream Americana?, 14 NEw ENO. J. ON CRIM. & CIv.
CONFINEMENT 1 (1988); Camp & Camp, Correctional Privatization in Perspective, 65 PRIsoN J.
14 (1985).
181. Such a downward movement in liability risks coupled with a constant or improved qual-
ity of correctional services, however, cannot and must not be seen as automatic consequences of
privatizing corrections. All contracting decisions necessarily involve, in effect, government's se-
lecting a specific set of private employees to perform a function that otherwise would be per-
formed by a specific set of public employees. Even though some sets of private employees can
provide correctional services more efficiently and more effectively than can some sets of public
employees, one cannot logically interpret the evidence to mean that all sets of private employees
will be more efficient and effective than all sets of public employees. With regard to liability
exposure and all other dimensions on which private and public correctional operations may be
evaluated, therefore, decisions to contract or to refrain from contracting should flow from an
objective assessment of the viability of specific options available-and not from mere ideological
predispositions that favor or oppose privatization.
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Whether the private alternative should be pursued, however, in-
volves a significant social policy issue that cannot be resolved by any
amount of legal analysis. There are thoughtful opponents to privatiza-
tion, opponents who are strongly critical of any and all efforts that
would have the effect of delegating the police powers of the state to
profit-motivated private sector corporations.112 Their extra-legal criti-
cism, sometimes presented within the context of legal analysis, has a
foundation that is far more political, philosophical, and symbolic
than it is constitutional or legal.
Their criticism ought to be considered thoughtfully and seriously.
The history of corrections, after all, is replete with illustrations of
what were imagined to be creative innovations that later proved that
one can jump from the frying pan only to land in the fire. Our own
largely pragmatic views on privatization, however, are flatly contrary
to those of such opponents. It may well be, as Blake McKelvey has
suggested,"8 3 that the history of penology and corrections in the
United States is a history of good intentions. Good intentions, how-
ever, do not necessarily yield good results. Today some 650,000 adult
men and women are confined in our state and federal prisons.' ' An-
other 250,000 are confined in local jails as they await trial or serve
sentences.'85 Many if not most of these men and women confront con-
ditions of confinement that are at least as likely to foster as they are
to lessen the likelihood of recidivism. Each day the facilities in which
they are housed become more and more overcrowded. Each day life
"on the inside" becomes more and more difficult.8 6 As one commen-
tator observed recently, "few abstract philosophical or political specu-
lations enter [inmates'] perceptions" of their keepers.8 7 "More
likely," he suggests:
the prisoner wonders whether the wearer of the badge is available
when needed, will want to help him, and is fair, knowledgeable,
182. See, e.g., I. ROBBINS, PRIVATE INCARCERATION, supra note 6.
183. B. MCKELVEY, AMERICAN PRISONS: A HISTORY OF GOOD INTENTIONS (1977).
184. Telephone interview with representative of Justice Statistics Clearinghouse, Washing-
ton, D.C. (April, 1989).
185. Id.
186. This unfortunate reality has not escaped the attention of the courts. Recently, for exam-
ple, Professor Ira P. Robbins commented on the growing crisis in corrections by observing that
"[tihirty six states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands are operating
prisons under court orders because of violations of the constitutional rights of prisoners. Each of
these orders has been issued in connection with total conditions of confinement and/or over-
crowding which resulted in prisoners being subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution." I. ROBBINS, PRISONERS AND THE LAW
app. A, at 3 (1988).
187. McConville, Aid from Industry? Private Corrections and Prison Overcrowding, in
AMERICA'S CORRECTIONAL CRISIS 221, 230-31 (1987).
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competent, and a decent human being. Conversely, the malign
prisoner might wish to know if his guard is lazy, weak, timid, stupid,
corruptible, and likely to be an aid or hindrance to his illegitimate
scheme. These are practical-indeed, too often life-and-death-
matters. It is likely that the vast majority of prisoners are completely
indifferent to symbolism, and wholly concerned with what happens
and with the quality of the officials with whom they come in contact
rather than with the organizational affiliation of such persons.,"8
The very difficult set of social policy issues raised by the privatiza-
tion debate ought to be resolved by moving in whichever direction has
a reasonable likelihood of yielding the more efficient and effective
means of improving the quality of correctional services. Moving in
such a direction carries with it the promise of better protecting the
rights of confined persons in the immediate future and the broader
public interest in the longer term. To favor traditional means of pro-
viding correctional services merely as a consequence of habit or from
a preference for symbolic representations of the power of the State is
just as absurd as to favor privatization merely because of some ab-
stract value one might impute to profit motives. The option to be fa-
vored is the option that proves its ability to get done the job at hand.
That option is not necessarily the option which wears a department of
corrections badge on its state-issued shirt.
188. Id.
